

Supreme Court, U. S.

FILED

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MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

# In the Supreme Court

OF THE

## United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. ....**75-1206**

No. ....

JULIAN S. H. WEINER, ET AL.,

*Petitioners,*

THE HONORABLE MALCOLM M. LUCAS, JUDGE OF  
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE  
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, AND ALL  
PLAINTIFFS IN IN RE EQUITY FUNDING COR-  
PORATION OF AMERICA SECURITIES LITIGATION,

*Respondents.*

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE  
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

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## PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO: THE HONORABLE WARREN E. BURGER, CHIEF JUSTICE, AND  
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED  
STATES

Petitioners Julian Weiner, Solomon Block, and Marvin A. Lichtig respectively pray that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the denial by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit of a Motion for Stay and petition for Writ of Mandamus of the Taking of Simultaneous Depositions in In Re Equity Funding Corporation of America Securities Litigation, M.D.L. Docket No. 142, in the Central District of California, Ninth Circuit No. 7535-71.

### CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW

The Order of the Court of Appeals is attached hereto as Appendix A. No formal opinion was rendered by that court. The order of the United States District Court for the Central District of California is not reported nor was an opinion rendered.

### JURISDICTION

The order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was entered on November 25, 1975. This petition is filed within 90 days thereof. 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c). The Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

### QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the pretrial ordering of a deposition schedule for so narrow an expanse of time as to force upon the parties the necessity of attending simultaneous depositions, i.e. depositions of major witnesses occurring at the same time and at different locations and which order expressly authorizes simultaneous depositions, distorts the clear intent of Rule 26(d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, prevents meaningful discovery, fair trial, adequate representation, and constitutes patent abuse of discretion.

### STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

Rule 26(d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

"Sequence and timing of discovery. Unless the court upon motion, for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not operate to delay any other party's discovery."

### STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On October 15, 1975, Judge Malcolm M. Lucas of the United States District Court for the Central District of California issued Discovery Order No. 2 ("Order") which formed the basis of the Motion for Stay/Writ of Mandamus in the Ninth Circuit below, a correct copy of which was attached to that petition below (Exhibit 12 therein). The Order established a schedule for the taking of depositions in the matter of "In re Equity Funding Corporation of America Securities Litigation, M.D.L. Docket No. 142" ("EFCA Litigation") in part as follows:

"In order to avoid unnecessary delay in the discovery and to allow prompt and just resolution of the claims made in this litigation, the Court will allow *and require concurrent depositions* pursuant to *Fed.R.Civ.Pro.* 26 (d). These concurrent depositions will be necessary to complete discovery by the October 1, 1976 cut-off date, but the parties should make all reasonable attempts to *minimize the overlapping of the depositions of key witnesses* in this litigation.

The depositions . . . shall be taken commencing on the dates set forth or determined as provided below, *unless otherwise agreed to by counsel present at the particular deposition.*

. . . It is contemplated that pursuant to the above schedule *more than one deposition* may take place *simultaneously* at different locations.

. . . The completion of the deposition . . . of any of the . . . parties or witnesses is *not* a condition precedent to the commencement of the deposition of any other party or witness . . . ."

"Order," p.2, line 11-23; p.8, lines 11-13, 1-4, emphasis added.

A "Motion to Reconsider" the ordered deposition schedule and to certify the question for appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) was filed November 7, 1975, and was denied.

The "Motion for Stay of the Taking of Simultaneous Depositions" and petition for Writ of Mandamus were filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in November, 1975, and denied November 25, 1975. A correct copy of that written denial is appended herewith as Appendix A and incorporated by this reference.

Concurrent depositions, many of them necessarily simultaneous, and all pursuant to "Discovery Order No. 2" continue unabated.

#### STATEMENT OF FACTS

"Discovery Order No. 2" ("Order") establishes concurrent depositions (in excess of 144 deponents requested by plaintiffs alone) to be taken between November 3, 1975 and August 2, 1976, a period of only 150 working days. The order expressly provides for "overlapping" and "simultaneous" depositions.

Simultaneous depositions have been scheduled pursuant to the "Order" often requiring counsel to attend three or more separate places in the same city on the same day and often three or more separate cities (e.g. Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York) on the same day. *cf.* affidavits of Nathan Markowitz and Richard DeSantis, appended herewith as Appendices B & C respectively and incorporated by this reference; *cf.* also the joint-affidavit of Harold A. Abeles and Nathan Markowitz (Exhibit 20) below. The prejudice is no longer speculative. Because of past occurrences, and if simultaneous depositions continue to occur, and each day such continues, petitioners will suffer and have suffered irreparable injury in that they have been denied adequate

representation through no fault of counsel and solely by virtue of the District Court's Order establishing simultaneous depositions, which Order is an abuse of the discretion granted by *Fed. R. Civ. Pro.* 26(d).

The instant actions grew out of the so-called Equity Funding Securities Fraud, a procedural summary of which is summarized at pp. 14-16 of the motion/petition below. Suffice it to say that the instant actions constitute a consolidation of in excess of 100 actions involving millions of shares of stock of Equity Funding Corporation of America and its subsidiaries in which petitioners' liability is hotly contested and in which defense discovery is extremely important.

The actions were filed March, 1973, were transferred to the multi-district docket December 11, 1973, were stayed December 20, 1973, were consolidated and refiled October 15, 1974, with very limited discovery beginning November 19, 1974 by depositions of only named deponents and all other depositions being stayed, and plenary deposition discovery commencing October 15, 1975 pursuant essentially to the adoption of plaintiffs' discovery schedule. The schedule, in effect, allows plaintiffs to conduct their discovery between November 3, 1975 and August 2, 1976, a period of nine months, leaving defendants the period August 2, 1976 to September 30, 1976, a period of two months, to conduct their discovery. The "concurrent" Order legally allows defense discovery prior to August, 1976, but, of course, Plaintiffs' court-ordered schedule practically and effectively precludes it.

Reference is also made (from Mr. Ritchie's affidavit [Exhibit 21] below) that pursuant to stay orders extant until 1975, defendants were not allowed access to information accumulated and residing in the Trustee's Depositories until October 15, 1975. Defense counsel were then for the first time allowed to view the 9 rooms (one the size of a

"gymnasium") filled with voluminous corporate records of Equity Funding Corp. and its subsidiaries and principals involved. The *index* to the boxes of documents stored in the 9 depositories measured 9 $\frac{1}{4}$ " in height. *cf.* the Chapter Ten Proceeding of "In re Equity Funding Corporation of America," Central District of California No. 73-03467. It needs no elaboration that meaningful representation of clients cannot occur at depositions where access to documentary information has been until very recently curtailed.

### REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. Any requirement of simultaneous depositions is inherently prejudicial and incapacitates counsel from adequately representing their client defendants.
2. Simultaneous depositions preclude effective defense preparation and deny petitioners as parties the right to a fair trial.
3. The requirement of simultaneous depositions is inherently abusive and in violation of Rule 26(d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
4. The ordered schedule is unfair and unworkable.

### DISCUSSION

The crucial issue is whether the Court can force civil defendants to hire a battery of lawyers so that counsel can be present at conflicting and simultaneously scheduled depositions, when the problem of simultaneity could be avoided simply by extending the deposition schedule. All discovery is expressly required to be concluded by October 1, 1976.

## ARGUMENT

### I

#### IT IS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCOMMODATE THE COURT-ORDERED DEPOSITION SCHEDULE WITHOUT HAVING SIMULTANEOUS DEPOSITIONS.

It is a matter of record herein that many occasions of simultaneous deposition have already occurred, will continue to occur, and were expressly contemplated by the Court below. That such an occurrence is inherently prejudicial to a party employing counsel who is a sole practitioner or two or three-member law firm cannot have escaped the Court's notice. By affidavits appended herewith Petitioners have shown how current deposition practice is occurring pursuant to the ordered schedule. Those are not isolated instances. Nor does the "Order" contemplate the scheduling of "second bite" depositions betwixt initial deposition dates ordered by the Schedule. The existence of "second bite" depositions increases simultaneity already extant because of the rapid scheduling of initial depositions.

While it was clearly within the Court's power to schedule depositions so as to avoid the problem of simultaneity, it has declined to do so and has drafted the Order expressly incorporating simultaneity.

### II

#### IN ALLOWING "CONCURRENT" DISCOVERY, RULE 26(d) IN NO WISE INTENDED TO AUTHORIZE THE SIMULTANEOUS TAKING OF DEPOSITIONS.

The new addition of Rule 26(d) was intended to abrogate the "priority rule" and its attendant evils. 48 F.R.D. 487, 506. It was not intended to force or allow the taking of simultaneous depositions:

"In practice, the depositions are not usually taken simultaneously. . . . One party may take a complete

deposition and then the other, or, if the depositions are extensive, one party deposes for a set time, and then the other."

*Id.* at 507.

Citing *Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Pub. Co.*, 11 F.R.D. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), the Rules commentators clearly intended that none

"... of the litigants should be *rendered sterile* with the necessary *preparation of its case* while the other party is conducting its examination . . . ."

*Caldwell-Clements, supra*, at 158 (emphasis added).

What everyone has failed to consider — and this no doubt accounts for the near absence of authority on this issue — is that the requirement of simultaneous depositions appears to be harmless but in fact is much more "sterilizing", debilitating to case preparation than was the nefarious "priority rule." The "priority rule" [now abrogated by Rule 26(d)] merely *delayed* the taking of depositions. Simultaneity *forbids entirely* the taking of selected depositions because of the physical impossibility of being two places at once. Failure to attend a duly noticed multi-party deposition constitutes a *waiver* thereof for non-examining parties. If "waiver" is the intentional relinquishment of a known right (*Johnson v. Zerbst*, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 58 S.Ct. 1019 [1938]), then no "waiver" of discovery ought to be attributed to the failure of counsel to attend selected depositions where the selection is forced upon counsel by the court. There is no authority in Rule 26(d) or anywhere to allow a trial court to force the dilemma of electing which depositions counsel must forego because of a totally impractical deposition schedule. The very essence of Rule 26(d) is precisely the opposite: no party is to be "rendered sterile" in case preparation while the other party is examining. The instant discovery order injects the very "sterility" Rule 26(d) was designed to prevent.

In *Mims v. Central Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.*, 178 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1949) the court held that

"... notices given as set forth above calling, as they did, for the taking of depositions of numerous witnesses on the same date, in scattered localities across the continent, were [not] in any sense reasonable. . . . [T]he depositions should not have been admitted for any purpose."

*Mims, supra*, at 59.

The primary purpose in giving notice of a deposition is to inform

"... [a]n opposing party . . . that he be available to confront his opponent's witnesses . . . in order that the opposing party might have the opportunity to confront them with preparation as to character, credibility, and qualification."

*Piel v. Falkner*, 426 F.2d 412, (C.C.P.A. 1970).

Simultaneous scheduling *ipso facto* prevents confrontation.

In light of the recency of the new Rules' amendments, and total absence of authoritative guidelines for Rule 26(d), petitioners urge this court definitively to proscribe for all time the imposition of simultaneous depositions by any federal trial court.

### III

#### REQUIRING SIMULTANEOUS DEPOSITIONS IMPAIRS ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION OF PARTIES AND PREVENTS FAIR TRIAL.

"[I]t was never intended . . . that a party might be able to compel his adversary, perhaps at enormous cost, to retain and fully instruct separate counsel in a dozen separate cities. Moreover, *his personal presence*

*might well be necessary to secure, by suggestions to his counsel, such proper cross-examination as would prevent a failure of justice.* Nor could he . . . determine, in advance of the direct examination, in which one of a dozen different places his personal attendance might be most required. . . . Such a practice should not be sanctioned by the court; it would be unreasonable and grossly oppressive.”

*Uhle v. Burnham*, 44 F. 729, 730-731 (C.C.S.D.N.Y., 1890), emphasis added.

It is the right of each party to participate in discovery and to be present at depositions. 4 *Moore's Federal Practice*, ¶ 26.52 (2nd ed., 1975). Many of the instant parties have retained sole practitioners or small law firms to represent them herein. *cf.* Appendix C herewith. A simultaneous deposition schedule is inherently abusive in requiring representation by large law firms whose personnel and resources are large enough to accommodate sending four or five associates to separate locations on the same day. Petitioner Block, whose estate is currently in a bankruptcy proceeding, has no resources to retain a hundred-member law firm. But financial resources aside, it is unfair to require simultaneity where information gained during one simultaneous deposition could not become immediately available for use in confronting other simultaneous deponents. Confrontation is essential to the deposition. *Piel v. Falkner*, *supra*.

“A set rule limiting the time within which pretrial discovery may be had may be appropriate for routine cases. . . . The exceptional case requires different treatment, however, and the spirit of the rules does not require that completeness in the exposure of the issues in the pretrial discovery proceedings be sacrificed to speed in reaching the ultimate trial on the merits. Delay should be avoided . . . but *adequate time must be*

*allowed for discovery of the facts and assembly of the proof.*”

*Freehill v. Lewis*, 355 F.2d 46, 48 (4th Cir. 1966), emphasis added.

The instant case is hardly “routine.” Indeed, it meets virtually all of the seven criteria for “non-routine” cases — extensive pretrial, complex proof, multiple parties, large stakes, sensational aspects, public questions, multiplicity of actions — *cf.* Kendig, “Procedures for Management of Non-Routine Cases,” 3 *Hofstra L. Rev.* 701, 703 (1975).

How is it fair to allow plaintiffs plenary access to deposition discovery while denying the same to defendants? The unfairness is patent:

“The party taking [plaintiffs, until August 2, 1976] such simultaneous depositions would not necessarily experience the same embarrassment, for, by means of carefully prepared written questions, he might safely intrust the examination to clerks, or even the officer taking the depositions. Such a practice should not be sanctioned by the court; it would be unreasonable, and grossly oppressive. Whoever seeks to avail of the provisions of Section 863 [now Rules 26 and 30] must so regulate his notice that the *opposite party and his counsel may be able to attend*, at the place and time named, *entirely unhampered by other engagements which he himself has imposed upon them.*”

*Uhle v. Burnham*, *supra*, at 731, emphasis added.

If the “personal presence” of a party at the deposition be necessary “to prevent a failure of justice”, (*Uhle*, *supra*), simultaneous scheduling, which *carte blanche* denies the party’s personal presence, constitutes *ab initio* a failure of justice. Nor can it be argued that some deponents are not so important as to warrant the personal presence of the party or counsel. Neither the party nor counsel can

“ . . . determine, in advance of the direct examination, in which one of a dozen different places his personal attendance might be most required.”

*Uhle, supra*, at 731.

The instant Order by requiring simultaneity insures a failure of justice by insuring non-attendance of defendants and/or their counsel at critical depositions. *ef.* Appendices B and C herein.

At a minimum due process contemplates the fairness of equal opportunity to prepare for trial.

“The present concept of due process stems from our American ideal of fairness in the treatment of all.”

*Howard v. United States*, 372 F.2d 294, 301 (9th Cir. 1967)

Adequacy of representation by counsel demands adequate opportunity to prepare for trial.

“... [W]e cannot minimize the fact that effective assistance [of counsel] refers not only to forensic skills but the painstaking investigation in preparation for trial.”

*Wolfs v. Britton*, 509 F.2d 304, 309 (8th Cir. 1975).

Multiple simultaneous depositions are so onerous and blatantly unfair as to make a sham of the fundamental purpose of discovery, vitiate adequacy of representation by counsel, deny equal opportunity to prepare for trial, and thereby deny due process and fair trial. They likewise abridge “Fifth Amendment equal protection” in creating a procedure commanding the use of multiple representation by counsel where there is no justification for creating such. *Cf. Johnson v. Robinson*, 415 U.S. 361, 364 n.4, 39 L.Ed. 2d 389, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1164 (1974).

## CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons a writ of certiorari must issue from this Court to reverse the order of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and immediately stop the unconscionable and abusive “Discovery Order No. 2,” which commands the taking of simultaneous depositions.

Respectfully submitted,  
ABELES & MARKOWITZ  
NATHAN MARKOWITZ  
JUDITH A. GILBERT  
GERRY L. ENSLEY

*Attorneys for Petitioners*

*Julian Weiner and Solomon Block*

RICHARD A. DeSANTIS

*Attorney for Petitioner Marvin A. Lichtig*

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- Appendix B: Affidavit of Nathan Markowitz.
- Appendix C: Affidavit of Richard DeSantis.
- Appendix D: Order of December 5, 1975, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Denying the instant petition for writ of mandamus.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IN RE EQUITY FUNDING CORPORATION  
OF AMERICA LITIGATION MDL-142-MML,

WOLFSON, WEINER, RATOFF & LAPIN  
and WOLFSON, WEINER & Co.,

*Petitioners*

vs.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE  
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA,

*Respondent*

ANNE ORINGER, et al.,

*Real Parties in Interest.*

FILED

NOV. 25, 1975  
EMIL E. MELFI, JR.

ERK  
U. S. COURT OF APPEALS

No. 75-3571  
ORDER

Before: BROWNING and KOELSCH, Circuit Judges

Upon due consideration, the emergency motion for stay  
is denied.

KOELSCH

BROWNING

U.S. Circuit Judges

APPENDIX A

### **AFFIDAVIT OF NATHAN MARKOWITZ**

Nathan Markowitz, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I am a partner of the law firm of Abeles & Markowitz; until January, 1976 the firm consisted of two partners and three associates; primarily because of the Equity Funding matter, especially the discovery order contemplating simultaneous depositions, I hired two additional lawyers who are now associated with the firm.

My firm represents two separate defendants named in "In re Equity Funding Corporation of America, Securities Litigation, M.D.L. Docket No. 142," namely Julian Weiner and Solomon Block.

I opposed the discovery Schedule set forth in Discovery Order No. 2 filed October 15, 1975 by The Honorable Malcolm M. Lucas, Judge of the United States District Court, inasmuch as the schedule contemplated the taking of scores of depositions "concurrently" and *simultaneously*. While pretrial discovery ought to proceed as rapidly as justice and fairness permits, I must recoil from the excessive and abusive present deposition schedule which necessitates the taking of *simultaneous* depositions of major witnesses in this litigation.

I opposed Discovery Order No. 2 on the basis that it is unfair and incapacitating to adequate trial preparation to be forced to forego attending someone's deposition because counsel must be elsewhere taking another deposition in the same matter.

I joined with Mr. Ritchie's "Motion to Reconsider" (Exhibit 13 below) the deposition schedule for the grounds therein stated.

The existence of simultaneous depositions has occurred many times pursuant to Discovery Order No. 2 and continues unabated.

### **APPENDIX B**

As evidence of the impossibility of adequately preparing the defenses of my clients in the instant matter I cite the following (taken from my office calendar) as typical (but in no sense exhaustive) examples requiring simultaneous attendance at different places:

DATE	DEPONENT	PLACE
Jan. 8, 1976	Strand & Co.	N.Y. City, N.Y.
Jan. 8, 1976	N.Y. Securities	N.Y. City, N.Y.
Jan. 8, 1976	William Wolback	Boston, Mass.
Jan. 8, 1976	Martin Lipton	N.Y. City, N.Y.
Jan. 8, 1976	Harold Richards*	Richmond, Va.
Jan. 9, 1976	Jerome Factor	Chicago, Ill.
Jan. 9, 1976	Harold Richards*	Richmond, Va.
Jan. 9, 1976	N.Y. Securities	N.Y. City, N.Y.
Jan. 12, 1976	Ohio Teachers Bd.	Columbus, Ohio
Jan. 12, 1976	Dishy Easton	N.Y. City, N.Y.
Jan. 12, 1976	N.Y. Securities	N.Y. City, N.Y.
Jan. 12, 1976	Elaine Berlin	N.Y. City, N.Y.
Jan. 15, 1976	Herbert Glaser	Los Angeles, Calif.
Jan. 15, 1976	N.Y. Securities	N.Y. City, N.Y.
Jan. 15, 1976	Dishy Easton	N.Y. City, N.Y.
Jan. 15, 1976	David Baker	Boston, Mass.
Feb. 2, 1976	Robert Spencer	Los Angeles, Calif.
Feb. 2, 1976	Martin Kugler	Los Angeles, Calif.
Feb. 2, 1976	Lee Smith	N.Y. City, N.Y.
Feb. 4, 1976	Robert Spencer	Los Angeles, Calif.
Feb. 4, 1976	Frank West	Los Angeles, Calif.
Feb. 4, 1976	William Brown	N.Y. City, N.Y.
Feb. 5, 1976	Stanley Beyer	Los Angeles, Calif.
Feb. 5, 1976	Daniel Fuss	Boston, Mass.
Feb. 5, 1976	Marshall Lebow	Los Angeles, Calif.
Feb. 5, 1976	Preston Tisch	N.Y. City, N.Y.

\* Rescheduled without notice to any defendants upon ex parte motion of Plaintiffs' counsel.

## APPENDIX B

Because of the foregoing schedule my firm (even with my present augmented staff of lawyers) was forced to forego attending many of the foregoing depositions.

The foregoing examples indicate the abusive nature of the present deposition schedule which is aggravated by Discovery Order No. 2's provision for the altering, without notice to absent parties, of the deposition schedule by the mere concurrence of parties *present* at any particular deposition. (Discovery Order No. 2, p. 2, lines 11-23.) Such provision makes attendance mandatory to avoid the prejudice of increased re-scheduling. By foregoing attendance at a deposition a party has not only failed to represent his client adequately and prepare the matter for trial, but has also, lost the opportunity to choose later deposition scheduling to avoid the increasing simultaneity.


NATHAN MARKOWITZ

Sworn before me this 16th day of February, 1976, at Beverly Hills, California.

Subscribed and Sworn  
to before me this 16th  
day of February, 1976.

STEVEN J. REVITZ

Notary Public in and for said County and State



## APPENDIX B

STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES } ss.

I, RICHARD A. DeSANTIS, being duly sworn, say:

I am a member of the State Bar of the State of California and I have been the attorney for Marvin A. Lichtig since 1973.

Despite my objection to Discovery Order No. 2, Judge Lucas set a schedule of depositions in this case permitting three simultaneous depositions or more to be taken in a single day; such schedule also orders such depositions to be taken, and some of said depositions were to be taken in New York or other states at the same time that depositions were scheduled in Los Angeles. When I made my objection to the Order in November 1975, I had one other attorney employed by me. I now have two attorneys employed by me; it has been both a financial burden and an impossible task to attempt to maintain any semblance of an organized search for information in order to protect my client. The many thousands, or even millions, of documents which must be reviewed by an attorney knowledgeable in this case to understand the complexities of both the plaintiff and defense positions make it totally impossible to review the documents and to attend the depositions at the same time. Despite the fact that I have been working an average of twelve to sixteen hours per day on this case, I am unable to keep up. Mr. Lichtig is a defendant in the M.D.L. actions as follows:

1. M.D.L. Docket No. 142, in the matter of *Equity Funding Corporation of America Securities Litigation*; (M.D.L. 142)
2. *Loeffler v. Riordan, Getty, Goldblum, et al.*, CV-75-1122 MML which is to come to trial in May 1976. (M.D.L. 142)

**APPENDIX C**

3. In re Equity Funding Corp. Bankruptcy Reorganization proceedings, (No. 73-03467 HP).

The attorneys for plaintiff Loeffler have set a deposition schedule so that their depositions are taken simultaneously with those of the class action plaintiffs in the M.D.L. Securities Litigation. Had the Court not allowed such simultaneous scheduling, I would have attended all of the depositions so that the discovery would be fair to all parties.

My client is unable to expend the large sums for this litigation and as a small law office we do not have the personnel to attend five or six depositions simultaneously in one day. The plaintiffs' committees have as many attorneys as they need because they are a series of large firms and they have divided up the effort, since they represent for all practical purposes, a single client, the representative plaintiffs in a class action. I know my client has been prejudiced by these procedures and I suggest that they do not meet the standards of fair play and equal justice. Since I have been representing Mr. Lichtig since 1973, I am aware of all of the facts relating to his matter; it would have been a tremendous task and inordinately expensive to have changed lawyers at any time. I have spent thousands of hours from 1973 to 1975 in such case.

In addition to the foregoing, it should be pointed out that frequently plaintiff's counsel have, without notice, changed the schedule of depositions without giving written notice to all parties but orally notifying those present at the deposition of the changes indicated. This has further compounded our problems, i.e., lack of notice and changed schedules.

On January 12, 1976, for example, the Ohio State Teachers Retirement Board's representative was deposed at the

offices of Wright, Harlor, Morris and Arnold, Huntington Trust Building, 37 West Broad Street, Columbus, Ohio. At the same time, the deposition of Bernard Dishey, scheduled to commence on January 12, 1976, which was later changed to January 14, 1976, went on from January 14, 1976 over through January 22nd. On January 13, 1976, the representative of the Oppenheimer Time Fund was being deposed at Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons & Gates, 299 Park Avenue, New York, and the deposition of Donald Kramer was being taken at Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, 100 Wall Street, New York. At the same time, the deposition of Jerome Evans, in the matter of *Loeffler v. Riordan, et al.*, was taken at Nossaman Waters, Krueger, Marsh & Riordan, 445 South Figueroa Avenue, 30th Floor, Los Angeles. In each instance, the depositions went on for several days; the Evans deposition went from January 12, 1976 for approximately five days; the Dishey-Easton deposition commenced actually on January 14, 1976, although scheduled for January 12, 1976, and went on for seven days; the deposition of Herbert Glaser began on January 15, 1976 at the offices of plaintiff's steering committee counsel, 3700 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles and the deposition of David Baker of the Boston group, commenced on January 15, 1976 and January 16, 1976 at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, 299 Park Avenue, New York, while on January 19th through the 30th, representatives of Bache & Company and its accountants, Alexander Grant & Company, were being deposed from January 19th through 30th, 1976, at the offices of Kreindler & Kreindler, 99 Park Avenue, New York.

Moreover, the deposition of John W. Bristol of the Boston group commenced on January 21st and ran through January 23rd at 299 Park Avenue, New York. The undersigned was only able to appear at the deposition of the Dishey-Easton representatives. I attempted to have one

associate with me especially for the purpose to appear at one of the other depositions. This is a clear example of the problems encountered by counsel which he has been unable to overcome.

In addition, this Court should be aware that Judge Lucas has entered an order in the matter of *Loeffler v. Reardon, et al.*, which is also a part of the M.D.L. action that all discovery must be completed by March 5, 1976; that all pretrial memoranda must be completed by April 6, 1976; and that a final pretrial conference is to take place on April 28, 1976; and a trial date of May 11, 1976 is set in that action. This office has been unable to even commence its discovery process with respect to that action because of the number of depositions being taken simultaneously. In the case of *Loeffler v. Reardon, et al.*, Case No. CV-74-2782, a part of the M.D.L. 142 series, the deposition of Jerome Evans commenced on January 12th and ran for approximately one week; the deposition of John Pennish commenced on January 27th and ran for approximately three days; the deposition of Charles Helfrick commenced on January 23rd and took approximately two to three days; and the deposition of Herbert Glazer commenced on February 10, 1976 and took approximately two days; and the depositions of Nelson Loud and Yuras Arkus-Duntov commenced in New York on February 9th and 10th, 1976, all at the same time as the other depositions were going on. This office, therefore, was unable to appear in the depositions of Helfrick, Pennish and Evans, except on one occasion when we were able to have an attorney present for one morning. I did not appear at the depositions of either Nelson Loud or Yuras Arkus-Duntov. It is significant that each of the aforesaid depositions were of former officers or directors of Equity Funding Corporation whose testimony might be very crucial to my client.

#### APPENDIX C

Attached hereto is one of several schedules of depositions which is not now current because changes have been made since receiving it. The same is attached hereto and marked Exhibit "1" and made a part of this affidavit.

I respectfully suggest to this Court that the deposition schedule must be stayed in fairness to this defendant.


Executed at Los Angeles, California this 16th day of February, 1976.

Subscribed and Sworn  
to before me this 16th  
day of February, 1976.

RICHARD A. DeSANTIS

STEVEN J. REVITZ

Notary Public in and for said County and State



#### APPENDIX C

(All depositions scheduled are pursuant to Discovery Order No. 2 unless otherwise indicated)

**Equity Funding Depositions**

	<u>Deponent</u>	<u>Date</u>
(2)	William Seidman of Seidman & Seidman	November 3-7, 1975 (adjourned to January 8, 1976)
(1)	Robert Spencer of Seidman & Seidman	November 6, 1975 Changed to November 24, 1975 per Order dated 10/24/75 Second Bite February 2, 1976
(1)	Phillip Wolfson of Wolfson, Weiner, Ratoff & Lapin	November 12, 1975
(22)	Fred Levin	December 17, 1975 Changed to November 13, 1975 per Order dated 10/29/75 at Terminal Island
(1)	Lorin Wilson of Haskins & Sells	November 17, 1975
(1)	Michael Balint of Haskins & Sells James C. Smith	November 18-25, 1975 Continued to December 16, 1975 November 21, 1975 (per Order dated 10/29/75) Not going forward as yet (Smith transferred to Illinois for criminal proceedings)
(1)	Robert Spencer of Seidman & Seidman	November 24-26 & 28, 1975 Second bite February 2, 1976
(1)	John Templeton	November 24-26, 1975
(1)	G. Philip Streetfield of Penn Life	November 26 & 28, 1975 Second bite February 3, 1976
(1)	Daniel Disipio	November 28, 1975 Second bite February 10, 1976

<u>Deponent</u>	<u>Date</u>
(7) William Wolbach of Boston Company	December 1-2, 1975
(6) Stein, Orphanos, Quinn, DeMartino and Valakis of The Dreyfus Fund	December 1-2, 1975 Continued to December 15-16 & 23, 1975
(1) Burton Borman of Penn Life	December 2, 1975 Continued to December 3, 1975
(1) Burton Borman of Penn Life	December 3, 1975 Second Bite May 11, 1976
(1) Stanley Beyer of Penn Life	December 5, 1975 Second Bite February 5, 1976
(8) Allen Gorrelick	December 8, 1975 Taken by Salomon Bros. (per pls' notice dated 11-10-75) (Continued to January 26-28, 1976)
(3) Alexander Grant & Co.	December 9, 1975 (Carr attending for NLM)
(1) Joe D. Bain of Penn Life	December 10, 1975 Continued to December 11, 1975 Second Bite February 11, 1976
(1) Joe D. Bain of Penn Life	December 11, 1975 Second Bite February 11, 1976
Arthur Lewis	December 12, 1975 (Per Order Dated 10/29/75) Transferred to Illinois for Criminal Proceedings — To be Continued
(15) William R. Salomon	December 15, 1975 (per letter dated 12-8-75)
(1) Robert Karr of Penn Life	December 15, 1975
(6) Stein, Orphanos, Quinn, DeMartino and Valakis of The Dreyfus Fund	December 15-16 & 23, 1975

## APPENDIX C — EXHIBIT 1

<u>Deponent</u>	<u>Date</u>
(9) Anthony Colao of Coopers & Lybrand	December 15-16, 1975
(1) Robert Tuttle of Penn Life	December 16, 1975
(1) Michael Balint of Haskins & Sells	December 16, 1975 Second Bite February 24, 1976
(22) Stanley Goldblum	December 17, 1975 (Per Order dated 10/29/75)
(9) Vincent Serrechia of Coopers & Lybrand	December 16-17, 1975
(21) William Suttle of Peat Marwick & Mitchell	December 17, 1975
(21) Dale Dodge of Peat, Marwick & Mitchell	December 18, 1975
(13) Seena Pukel	December 19, 1975
(21) Marlin Wilson of Peat, Marwick & Mitchell and its Client Ranger Nat'l Life Ins. Co.	December 19, 1975 No Second Bite
(9) William Burress of Coopers & Lybrand	December 19-20 & 22, 1975
(1) Herbert Glaser	December 22, 1975 (Per Order dated 10/29/75) Continued to January 15, 1976
(11) Lisadent, Inc.	December 22, 1975
(11) Murray Gilbert	December 22, 1975
(12) Dan's Supreme Supermarket, Inc.	December 22, 1975
Representatives of Joseph Frogatt & Co.	December 22-31, 1975

## APPENDIX C — EXHIBIT 1

	<u>Deponent</u>	<u>Date</u>
(3)	Representatives of the New York Stock Exchange	December 22, 1975 (Carr appearing for NLM) Not Going Forward
	Guy Michaels	December 22, 1975
(9)	William O. Wilhelm & P.J. Miller of Coopers & Lybrand	December 23, 1975
(3)	Representatives of the American Stock Exchange	December 23, 1975 (Carr appearing for NLM) Not going forward
(13)	Morris Pukel (changed to Seena Pukel)	December 23, 1975 (advanced to December 19, 1975)
(12)	Nat Berens	December 23, 1975
(14)	Robert Selig	December 24, 1975
(1)	Robert Tookey & Gil Kerns of Milliman and Robertson, Inc.	December 26-31, 1975 (continued to December 29, 1975)
	Lloyd Edens	December 29, 1975 (Per Order dated 10/29/75) Not going forward since Edens was transferred to Ill. for criminal proceedings
(10)	M. I. Ginsberg, Roy V. Johnson, & Duane Boe of Coopers & Lybrand	December 29, 1975
(1)	Robert Tookey & Gil Kerns of Milliman and Robertson, Inc.	December 29, 1975
(20)	Wilburn Hippard of Coopers & Lybrand	December 30, 1975
(1)	Stuart Robertson of Milliman & Robertson, Inc.	December 31, 1975

## APPENDIX C — EXHIBIT 1

	<u>Deponent</u>	<u>Date</u>
(3)	Representatives of New York Securities, Inc. and its consultant accountant, Alexander Grant & Co.	January 2-16, 1976 (changed to January 5, 1976)
(4)	Harold Richards of Fidelity Corp.	January 2, 1976 Changed to March 29, 1976
(4)	Harold Richards of Fidelity Corp.	January 5, 1976 Changed to January 2, 1976
(3)	Javis J. Slade, Hamilton Robinson, Jr., Hans H. Sammer, Nelson Loud, Stanford Brainerd, Charles Smith, Max Schultze, Richard W. Smith, C. Severance, S. Mathes, L. Miralia, Mr. McKeekin of New York Securities, Inc.	January 5, 1976
(15)	Arnold Elkind	January 5, 1976
(12)	Hanover Square Associates	January 5, 1976
(16)	Oppenheimer Time Fund, Inc.	January 5, 1976 (Changed to January 13, 1976)
(3)	New York Stock Exchange, Inc. by Merle S. Wick	January 6, 1976 (per letter dated 12-17-75) (Carr appearing for NLM) Not going forward — to be noticed for some time in 2-76
(8)	Jerrold Fine of Steinhardt, Fine & Berkowitz	January 6-7, 1976 (per pls' notice dated 11/10/75)
(17)	Max Newmark	January 6, 1976
(16)	S. D. Cohn & Co.	January 6, 1976

## APPENDIX C — EXHIBIT 1

<u>Deponent</u>	<u>Date</u>
(7) William Wolbach of the Boston Group	January 7, 8, and 9, 1976 (per notice dated 12/23/75)
(15) Martin Lipton	January 8, 1976 Taken by Trading Defendants
(17) Harold Shepet	January 8, 1976 (Changed to 2-12-76)
(12) Strand & Co.	January 8, 1976
(1) L. Wm. Seidman of Seidman & Seidman	January 8, 1976 (Continued from 11/7/75) (Changed to 2/13 and 2/14/76)
(18) Jerome Factor Individually and as Trustee	January 9, 1976
(19) Ohio State Teacher's Retirement Board	January 12, 1976
(3) Bernard Dishy, Stanley Easton, Elaine Berlin of Dishy, Easton & Co.	January 12-19, 1976 (Changed to January 14, 1976)
(16) Oppenheimer Time Fund, Inc.	January 13, 1976 (Continued from January 5, 1976)
(6) Donald Kramer	January 13, 1976 (Changed to 2-9-76)
(23) Bernard Dishy, Stanley Easton, Elaine Berlin of Dishy Easton & Co.	January 14, 1976 (Continued from 1-12-76) (New change of place)
(1) Herbert Glaser	January 15, 1976 (Continued from 12-22-75)
(7) David Baker of the Boston Group	January 15 and 16, 1976 (per notice dated 12-23-75)
(3) Representatives of Bache & Co. and its Consultant Accountant, Alexander Grant & Co.	January 19-30, 1976

## APPENDIX C — EXHIBIT 1

<u>Deponent</u>	<u>Date</u>
(3) Representatives of Bache & Co. by Robert Gallagher, Frederick Kelsey, Allan Freiman, Wallace Latour and Jack Acker- man, and its Consultant Accountant Alexander Grant & Co. by Charles Maurer, Edward McGowen, Sheldon Silver, David Stephens, Frank Greenberg, and Ben Taylor	January 19-30, 1976 (individuals designated by notice dated 12-29-75)
(7) John W. Bristol of the Boston Group	January 21, 22, and 23, 1976 (per notice dated 2-23-75)
(7) William Moore of the Boston Group	January 26, 27, and 28, 1976 (per notice dated 12-23-75)
(8) Allen Gorrelick	January 26-28, 1976 (Continued from 12-8-75) Taken by Salomon Bros. (Carr attending for NLM)
(7) Donald Evans of the Boston Group	January 29 and 30, 1976 (per notice dated 12-23-75)
(1) Robert Spencer of Seidman & Seidman	February 2, 1976 Second Bite
(7) Lee Smith	February 2 and 3, 1976 (per notice dated 12-23-75) Taken by Lawton Gen. Corp.
(1) G. Philip Streetfield of Penn Life	February 3, 1976 Second Bite
(7) William Brown	February 4, 1976 (per notice dated 12-23-75) Taken by Lawton Gen. Corp.
(7) Daniel Fuss of the Boston Group	February 5 and 6, 1976 (per notice dated 12-23-75)

## APPENDIX C — EXHIBIT 1

<u>Deponent</u>	<u>Date</u>
(7) Thomas W. Courtney	February 9, 10 and 11, 1976 (per notice dated 12-23-75) Taken by Lawton Gen. Corp.
(6) Donald Kramer	February 9, 1976 (Continued from 1-13-76)
(1) Stanley Beyer of Penn Life	February 10, 1976 Second Bite
(1) Daniel J. Disipio of Penn Life	February 10, 1976 Second Bite
(1) Joe D. Bain of Penn Life	February 11, 1976 Second Bite
(17) Harold Shepet	February 12, 1976 (Continued from 1-8-76)
(1) L. Wm. Seidman of Seidman & Seidman	February 13 and 14, 1976 (Changed from 1-8-76)
(1) Michael Balint of Haskins & Sells	February 24, 1976 Second Bite
(4) Harold Richards (and other representatives) of Fidelity Corp.	March 29, 1976 (per order filed 12-22-75)
(1) Burton Borman of Penn Life	May 11, 1976 Second Bite
(1) Representatives of Wolfson, Weiner, Ratoff & Lapin, including the following individuals on a two-weeks-on, one- week-off basis: James Ash, Gene (or James) V. Ashjian, Fred Baum, Christopher Bennett, John Doe Kinsella, William Cory, Debbie Furlough, Robert Greer, Steven G. Arwezman, Donald Hedrick, Roy	February 2 — March 12, 1976

## APPENDIX C — EXHIBIT 1

<u>Deponent</u>	<u>Date</u>
Horn, Mike Hornstein, Terry Kleiman, Maurice Kushner, Neal Lewis, Morris Marvin Mesirow, Michael Mucciolo, Martin Paravado, Al Pasternack, Allen Payne, Ray Pratt, Carl Robertson, Leonard Sachs, Ray Standish, Art Stelmach, Blanche Terkelsen, Eloise Whiteside, Fred Baugh, Martin Kugler, Martin Livingston, Benjamin Pass, Richard Sommer, Frank West, Barry Binder, Murray Freund, Ray Park, William T. Tilley, Sigmund Watner, Christopher Bennett, Robert Reisner, Garry Hnatyshak, Barry Naiditch, Stephen Siff, Greta Houston	
(1) Representatives of Seidman & Seidman, including the following individuals on a two- weeks-on, one-week-off basis: Solomon Block, Julian Weiner, Phillip Wolfson, Al Finci, Frank West, Neal (or Neil) Lewis, Joseph De Armas, Richard Styvaert, Richard Seligman, Neill Freeman, Sydney Sawin (or Sawyn), Robert Reisner, Thomas O. McKee, Marshall Labow, George	March 15 — May 15, 1976

## APPENDIX C — EXHIBIT 1

DeponentDate

(Seidman & Seidman  
— cont'd)

Kenas, Robert Chernock,  
James W. Ward, Richard  
Woldo, Steven  
Gryczman, Carter  
Omens, John Abernathy,  
James Dargavel, Fred  
Chazen, J. Rowley,  
Chaim Markheim,  
Raymond T. Irvine,  
Robert Grossman,  
Michael Eisenberg, Dave  
Oratov, and Robert  
Spencer

- (1) Representatives of      May 17 — June 25, 1976  
Haskins & Sells,  
including the following  
individuals on a two-  
weeks-on, one-week-off  
basis: Michael L. Balint,  
H. Clayton Chandler,  
William W. Gerecke,  
Kostas Gussis, Richard  
B. Hill, Raymond L.  
Horn, Charles F.  
Lemons, John C.  
McCormick, Paul W.  
Pinkerton, Bennett S.  
Robinson, Robert Van  
Arsdale, Robert E. White,  
Arthur F. Wilkins,  
James A. Wilson, Curtis  
E. Youngdahl, Bernard  
H. Berkman, George F.  
Kerhove, Leon H.  
McElvany, William W.  
McDonald, Albert J.  
Reznicek, Richard A.  
Schaab, Donald W.

**APPENDIX C — EXHIBIT 1**DeponentDate

Boyer, Thomas G. Clark,  
Philip A. Harmon, Mrs.  
Maryanne W. Rex,  
Richard B. Thomas,  
Gustave A. Reh, Jr., Del  
M. Jones, Kenneth M.  
Rosenberg, Joseph  
Backer, Sanford H.  
Bragg, Summar R. Wein,  
Dennis L. Fischel,  
Richard W. Johnson,  
William A. Mahan,  
Patriica L. Pyfrom  
(Smith), Samuel E.  
Wallace, Brian H. M.  
Wharton, Gary J.  
Steingrebe, and  
Robb Todd

- (1) Defendants named as      June 28 — August 2, 1976  
officers, directors and  
agents of EFCA and as  
EFCA fiduciaries in the  
first amended complaint  
and other representatives  
of EFCA or its  
subsidiaries
- (1) Representatives of      May 17 — June 25, 1976  
former accounting  
employers of Solomon  
Block (other than  
Wolfson, Weiner, Ratoff  
& Lapin and Seidman  
& Seidman)
- (6) Representatives of      May 17-24, 1976  
Chemical Bank
- (5) Representatives of First      May 17-24, 1976  
National City Bank

**APPENDIX C — EXHIBIT 1**

- 1 — 3700 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 730, Los Angeles, deposition room — 384-9313 pls' counsel's office in same building, Suite 575, 380-4200
- 2 — Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, 1666 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006
- 3 — Kreindler & Kreindler, 99 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10006
- 4 — Hirschler & Fleischer, Fourth and Main Streets, Richmond, Virginia 23219
- 5 — Bader & Bader, 270 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y.
- 6 — Wolf, Popper, Ross, Wolf & Jones, 845 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y.
- 7 — Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, 299 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y.
- 8 — Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, One State Street Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10004, (212) 344-0600
- 9 — Coopers & Lybrand, 1251 Avenue of the Americas, New York, N.Y.
- 10 — Coopers & Lybrand, One Bush Street, San Francisco, Ca.
- 11 — White & Case, 14 Wall Street, New York, N.Y.
- 12 — Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 140 Broadway, New York, N.Y.
- 13 — Curtis, Mallet, Prevost, Colt & Mosle, 100 Wall Street, New York, N.Y.
- 14 — Schmader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, 1719 Packard Building, Philadelphia, Penn.
- 15 — Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, One Wall Street, New York, N.Y.
- 16 — Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons & Gates, 299 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y.
- 17 — Milgrim, Thomajan & Jacobs, P.C., 25 Broadway, New York, N.Y.
- 18 — Arnstein, Gluck, Weitzerfeld & Minow, Sears Tower, Chicago, Illinois

#### APPENDIX C—EXHIBIT 1

- 19 — Wright, Harlor, Morris & Arnold, Suite 900, Huntington Trust Bldg., 37 West Broad Street, Columbus, Ohio
- 20 — Palm Beach County Courthouse, 300 North Dixie Highway, West Palm Beach, Florida
- 21 — Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, 515 South Flower Street, Los Angeles
- 22 — Federal Correctional Institute, Terminal Island, (At Warden's Conference Room or Women's Division) 831-8961
- 23 — Kimmelman, Sexter, Elovitch & Sobel, 25 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10004

#### APPENDIX C—EXHIBIT 1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IN RE EQUITY FUNDING CORPORATION  
OF AMERICA LITIGATION

WOLFSON, WEINER, RATOFF & LAPIN  
and WOLFSON, WEINER & Co.,

*Petitioners*

vs.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE  
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA,

*Respondent*

FILED

DEC. 5, 1975

EMIL E. MELFI, JR.

CLERK

U. S. COURT OF APPEALS

No. 75-3571

ORDER

Before: DUNIWAY and SNEED, Circuit Judges

Upon due consideration, the petition for writ of mandamus is denied.

DUNIWAY

SNEED

U.S. Circuit Judges

APPENDIX D